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ABSTRACT 
Blowout Preventer (BOP) has maintained its function as a safety barrier and the last line 
of defence against oil and gas spills since its development in the early 1900s. However, 
as drilling and exploration activities move further offshore, challenges pertaining to 
reliable operation of the subsea BOP systems continue to be a source of concern for 
stakeholders in the industry. In spite of recent advancements in reliability analysis of 
safety instrumented systems (SISs), the research on reliability assessment of BOP is still 
lacking in some regards. There are gaps in the literature with respect to the 
incorporation of preventive maintenance (PM) strategies as well as dynamic operating 
conditions into BOP reliability analysis. To address these gaps, this paper develops an 
advanced analysis method using stochastic Petri nets (SPN) to estimate the reliability of 
subsea BOP systems subject to condition-based mainten ce (CBM) with different 
failure modes. The BOP system is divided into five subsystems which are connected in 
series with each other and categorised into degrading and binary units. The performance 
of the BOP system in terms of availability, reliability and mean-time-between failures 
(MTBF) is obtained and analysed. A sensitivity analysis is also performed to evaluate 
the effect of fault coverage factor and redundancy design on system performance. The 
results show that both the fault coverage factor and redundancy have significant impact 
on the BOP’s reliability, availability and MTBF. 
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1 Introduction 
A large number of safety instrumented systems (SISs) are in use within the oil and gas 
industry for drilling, production, processing and storage purposes (Liu, 2014; Liu and 
Rausand, 2016). The complexities associated with these systems are amplified when 
taking into account the myriad of challenges within the offshore environment. The 
blowout preventer (BOP) is one of the most important SISs in the subsea oil and gas 
sector which is employed in the event of the failure of the primary well control process. 
The main function of a BOP is to seal the well in the event of a blowout (i.e. an 
uncontrolled flow of liquid and gases during the drilling process) (Holand and Rausand, 
1987). BOPs are one of the most critical SISs among all drilling equipment and, as a 
result, the downtime associated with removal of the BOP stack is known as one of the 
costliest activities in offshore drilling operations (Zou et al., 2016). The main 
components of a subsea BOP system are: one or two annular preventers (which work to 
seal around tubulars in the well and around an open hole); three to six ram preventers 
(which can seal several pipes within the well and seal an empty hole depending on 
dressing); the wellhead connector and the lower marine riser package connector (which 
link the entire BOP to the wellhead and to the riser directly hooked to the drilling 
platform); and a number of choke and kill valves and li es (which work to manipulate 
pressurized fluid pumped in and taken out of the well) (Shafiee et al., 2019b). Figure 1 
shows typical configurations for a conventional and  modern BOP. 
** Figure 1 ** 
Figure 1. Conventional (left) and modern (right) BOP configurations (Liu et al., 2015b). 
Based on operators’ choice, BOP subsystems can differ in number, size and 
capacity, especially when exploration into deeper waters is seemingly the most likely 
way forward (Hu et al., 2013). Aside from its main function of monitoring and 
maintaining well integrity, the BOP system has some other functions such as (i) sealing 
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off well fluids (ii) providing an avenue for the controlled addition and extraction of 
fluid into and out of the well; and (iii) sealing the wellhead.  
Since its development in the early 1900s, the BOP’s main purpose has been to 
function as a safety barrier during drilling operations. Its nature and complex assembly 
have ensured that only minor modifications have been made since its adoption as last 
line of defense for any drilling or workover operation. However, the shift of exploration 
to reserves in deeper waters and harsher environments has ensured that the setbacks to 
reliable operation of the subsea BOP and its subsystems remains a focal point for 
stakeholders within the oil and gas industry. The BOP failures usually result in injury, 
loss of life, economic losses or environmental damage,  prime example of which is the 
Macondo incident on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico (Animah and 
Shafiee, 2020). 
In spite of recent advancements in reliability analysis of SISs, the research on 
reliability assessment of BOP is still lacking in some regards. There are gaps in the 
literature with respect to the incorporation of preventive maintenance (PM) strategies as 
well as dynamic operating conditions into BOP reliabi ty analysis. To address these 
gaps, this paper develops a stochastic Petri nets (SPN) model to estimate the reliability 
of subsea BOP systems subject to condition-based mainten nce (CBM) with different 
failure modes. The BOP system is divided into five subsystems which are connected in 
series with each other and categorised into degrading and binary units. The annular 
preventers, ram preventers, hydraulic connectors, and choke and kill system are 
considered as degrading units; whereas the MUX control system is considered as a 
binary unit. Four different condition states – namely: normal, degraded, critical and 
failed – are considered for each failure mode. The advanced reliability analysis metrics 
such as failure criticality index and reliability importance are obtained, in addition to 
standard metrics such as the reliability, availability and mean-time between failures 
(MTBF). This study, to the best of the author’s knowledge, is the first attempt to 
improve the robustness of the state-of-the-art reliability analysis methods by modelling 
the operation of the subsea BOP system with multiple degradation states.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
BOP reliability and provides an overview on Petri-nets modelling. In section 3, 
stochastic Petri-net models are developed for different BOP subsystems. Section 4 
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presents the results of the analysis, and section 5 concludes the study and proposes 
directions for future research. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Reliability analysis of subsea BOP 
The reliability analysis of BOP systems has come into prominence in response to recent 
incidents that have happened in the oil and gas industry (Liu et al., 2015a). The 
reliability assessment techniques for subsea BOP systems have evolved considerably 
since the first study by Holand and Rausand (1987). They employed fault tree analysis 
(FTA) to estimate the probability of a blowout event using the real data from drilling 
documents, BOP tests and well equipment failure reports. Some years later, Fowler and 
Roche (1993) also used FTA in addition to failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) to 
analyse the reliability of a subsea BOP and a hydraulic control system. Zou et al. (2016) 
applied the reliability block diagram (RBD) technique to analyse the reliability of 
subsea BOPs. The results were then compared against design requirements. Recently, 
Shafiee et al. (2019c) proposed an integrated FTA and FMEA model to analyse the 
reliability of subsea BOPs. They weighted the minimal cut sets derived from the fault 
trees based on Birnbaum’s measure of importance and then used the weights to update 
Risk Priority Numbers (RPNs) obtained from the use of traditional FMEA. 
There are significant drawbacks to using conventional reliability assessment 
techniques (Animah and Shafiee, 2018). According to Bai and Bai (2010), complex and 
dynamic systems are difficult to model using conventional techniques; thus, the 
numerical analysis of the system’s reliability can be extremely arduous. Both the FTA 
and FMEA techniques only work well for non-repairable systems, and do not possess a 
time element which is vital a characteristic when analysing complex subsea systems like 
the BOP. Furthermore, differentiating between sever failures caused by compound 
faults and common-cause failures is impossible using the FMEA (Liu et al., 2015a).  
Attempts have been made to overcome some of the drawbacks of the conventional 
reliability assessment techniques (Shafiee t al., 2019a). Advanced reliability 
techniques such as Bayesian Network (BN), Markov analysis, Monte-Carlo simulation 
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(MCS), Petri Net (PN), and their different variations have been developed and applied 
to assess the reliability of subsea BOPs (Liu et al., 2017).  
BN has recently gained prominence as a robust tool for the reliability analysis of 
BOP systems (see Liu et al., 2015b). This is mainly as a result of its ability to perform 
fault diagnosis as well as predictive analytics (Cai et al., 2012). Markovian models, 
such as homogeneous Markov chains or hidden Markov models, have also been used to 
evaluate the reliability of complex systems such as subsea BOPs. Markov models are 
very flexible in representing the dynamic behaviour f engineering systems (Boyd, 
1998). MCS is also a widely used technique to verify the BOP reliability analysis results 
obtained with different analytical methods recommended in IEC 61508 (2010). MCS 
provides to incorporate all practical aspects of system operation (such as failure and 
repair information) into reliability assessment (Wu et al., 2018). The PN technique, 
which is used in this study, is a numerical and graphical tool used to model 
asynchronous, simultaneous, distributed and parallel systems (Sadou and Demmou, 
2009). One of its variations, Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) explicitly introduces a time 
parameter (Cai et al., 2013), making it very suitable for reliability anlysis of SISs such 
as subsea BOPs. In the next subsection, the PN methods are briefly reviewed. 
2.2 Petri Nets 
A Petri Net (PN) is a graphical modelling tool developed by Carl Petri as part of his 
PhD dissertation (Petri, 1962) to determine the most appropriate method for a defined 
theory of communication. It is used to model and analyse complex systems which are 
defined as distributed, stochastic, simultaneous and no -deterministic (Murata, 1989).  
A typical PN model comprises of four essential graphical features, namely: places, 
transitions, arcs and tokens. Places, which represent th  state of a system, subsystem or 
component, are denoted by a hollow circle (Leigh and Dunnett, 2016). Transitions allow 
the system to change states, making it possible to model the dynamic behaviour of a 
system and is denoted by a rectangle. Tokens are little solid circles always located 
within places and represent the current state of the system. Arcs connect places to 
transitions and vice-versa and are represented by solid arrows (Le and Andrews, 2016). 
The state of the system being modelled changes when on  or more tokens are fired. A 
token being fired signifies that it has been transferred from one place to another. This 
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event occurs as a result of a transition becoming enabl d (Liu et al., 2015a). A transition 
becomes enabled only when pre-defined requirements are met. 
In reliability and safety engineering, the PN technique has been applied towards 
different subject areas, including: remaining useful li e (RUL) prediction (Elmeliani et 
al., 2013), reliability evaluation (Liu et al., 2017), safety analysis (Leveson and Stolzy, 
1987), and maintenance modelling (Rochdi et al., 1999).  
The conventional PN, which does not take changes in time into consideration, is 
defined as a 5-tuple or a finite sequence of five elem nts (Liu et al., 2013). Those 
elements are represented as follows: 
 = 	 , , ,	,
,                                                                                             (1) 
where: 
 = 	 , , , … ,  represents a finite set of places; 
 = 	 , , , … ,  represents a finite set of transitions; 
⊆	 ×  ∪  ×  represents a set of arcs; 
	 ∶  →  − ∅ represents a weight function; and 

 ∶  →  represents the initial marking, with 	∩	 = 	∅, 	∪	 ≠ ∅. 
Stochastic Petri net (SPN) is a variation of the conventional PN model which was 
developed to take the concept of time into account when performing reliability analysis 
(Kleyner and Volovoi, 2010). The SPN which forms the basis of our model in this study 
takes the concept of time into account and helps to analyse the dynamic behaviour of 
systems. The transitions for SPNs have delay time and this delay can either be 
deterministic or follow a probability distribution. An SPN is a 6-tuple given by (Liu et
al., 2017): 
 = 	 , , ,	,
, λ ,                                                                                      (2) 
where , , ,		and	
 are defined as above, and λ = λ, λ, λ, … , λ" represents the 
set of transition firing rates.  
3 The proposed SPN model 
A SPN model is developed in this section to analyse the degradation performance and 
reliability of subsea BOPs. Due to the complexity of the system, it is broken into five 
subsystems. These subsystems include: the ram preventers, annular preventers, choke 
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and kill system, hydraulic connectors and the Multiplex Electro-Hydraulic (MUX) 
control system. The first four of the aforementioned five subsystems can be described as 
degrading units, meaning that a measurable amount of time passes from when a fault is 
detected to when functional failure actually occurs. This time interval is represented by 
a curve called P-F. The P-F curve is a graph that sow  the health of a system over time 
to identify the interval between potential failure and functional failure (Elusakin et al., 
2019). The fifth subsystem, i.e., the MUX control system, is described as a binary unit 
since a fault in the system immediately causes functio al failure. The BOP subsystems 
are connected in series with each other, meaning that if one of these subsystems fails the 
entire system will stop functioning. Redundancies can occur on some of the subsystems 
such as the annular and ram preventers as well as the MUX control system. The effect 
of redundancy design on the BOP system performance will be discussed in section 4.2.  
The SPN technique is employed in this study to model the degradation of different 
BOP subsystems after which the RBD technique is used to combine results obtained 
from each individual subsystem and assess the reliability of the whole system. The 
software tool used to develop the SPN model is TimeNET Version 4 (for more see: 
https://timenet.tu-ilmenau.de/). TimeNET was develop d at the Technische Universität 
of Berlin to model SPNs. The ReliaSoft BlockSim 10 software tool was also used to 
build an RBD model for the entire BOP system and perform the overall reliability 
analysis (for more see: https://www.reliasoft.com/products/reliability-
analysis/blocksim). Each component is modelled separately given that they are subject 
to different failure modes with different causes having different effects on the overall 
system. 
3.1 SPN model for degrading subsystems 
The models developed for the four degrading subsystem  (i.e., the ram preventers, 
annular preventers, choke and kill system, and hydraulic connectors) are different but 
they have a common basis. Each component possesses diff rent failure modes 
associated with its operation. These failure modes show different ways that the 
subsystem may fail. Therefore, they occur with different frequencies and their repair 
times are also different. Four different states areconsidered to present the health 
condition of subsystems. These include: normal, degraded, critical and failed. A 
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transition between two states represents the events tha  take place for degradation to 
progress from one state to another. In this study, the transitions signify the continued 
operation of the system as well as the repair process. This means that the condition of 
each subsystem degrades from the normal state to th degraded state, then to the critical 
state, and eventually to the functional failure state. The times/delays associated with 
each transition represent how long it takes for the subsystem to further degrade. In the 
case of repair, it represents the duration of repai. The movement of the token signifies 
the change in the asset condition; therefore, the token being situated within the 
degraded place signifies that the asset is in the degraded state. 
The SPN models developed for the four degrading subsystems of the annular 
preventer, choke and kill system, hydraulic connectors and the ram preventers are 
presented in Figure 2Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5, respectively. As can be seen, the 
models for degrading subsystems begin with a token residing in the normal state, 
signifying that the subsystem is operating as it normally should. The transition right 
after the normal state in the prevalent failure mode is enabled and the token is fired. 
** Figure 2 ** 
Figure 2. Petri net model for the annular preventer system. 
** Figure 3 ** 
Figure 3. Petri net model for the choke and kill system. 
** Figure 4 ** 
Figure 4. Petri net model for the hydraulic connectors. 
** Figure 5 ** 
Figure 5. Petri net model for the ram preventers. 
The failure transition parameters follow Weibull distr bution as it most aptly 
represents condition deterioration in failure-prone systems. The two-parameter Weibull 
probability distribution function is given by (Nielsen, 2011): 
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3, for & > 0,	and ' > 0	,                                      (3) 
where & is the shape parameter and ' is the scale parameter. Failure data was sourced 
from the literature, and the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) technique was 
applied to estimate the corresponding shape and scale parameters for each subsystem. 
On the other hand, the repair transitions are assumed to follow exponential distribution. 
The model input parameters for the four degrading subsystems are given in Table 1. 
** Table 1 ** 
Table 1. Life data for degrading BOP subsystems. 
The repair action begins before a failure occurs and fter it is determined that the 
component is in the degraded state; therefore, repair paths are created for each failure 
mode. This is represented by the token travelling from the degraded state back through 
the repair transition to the normal state. It is only i  the event that the repair action does 
not take place, that the token continues its movement from the degraded state to the 
critical state and then to the failed state, signifyi g functional failure. 
3.2 SPN model for binary systems 
The SPN model for binary systems (i.e., the MUX contr l subsystem) begins with the 
token residing in the normal state, indicating that it is operating normally. Since this is a 
binary system, only two states are involved: normal and failed. The SPN model 
developed for the MUX control subsystem is presented in Figure 6. 
** Figure 6 ** 
Figure 6. Petri net model for the MUX control subsystem. 
There are also six exponential transitions between both states, with each transition 
representing a different mode by which the control system may fail. Upon failure, which 
is signified by the token being in the failed state, the repair transition is activated and 
the token is fired, taking the control system back into the normal state. The transitions 
for the MUX control subsystem are exponential transitions as there is no requirement to 
model degradation. The model input parameters for the MUX control subsystem are 
obtained from Holand and Awan (2012), and are given n Table 2. 
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** Table 2 ** 
Table 2. Model input parameters for the MUX control subsystem. 
The reliability data obtained from the SPN simulation of each BOP subsystem is 
then used as an input data for reliability modelling of the entire BOP system using the 
RBD technique.  
4 Results and analysis 
4.1 Reliability 
The reliability of a system is defined as the probability that it will perform its intended 
function(s) for a specified period of time under the specified conditions (Zengkai et al., 
2013). The subsystems of the BOP system are all connected in series. Therefore, the 
failure of one subsystem will invariably lead to the failure of the entire BOP system. 
Therefore, the BOP system’s reliability is calculated by:  
6$ = 	∏ 68$98:  ,                                                                                               (4) 
where ; represents the number of subsystems and 68$ represents the reliability of the 
subsystem < in the system.  
The transient reliability plots for the five BOP sub ystems are depicted in Figure 7. 
As can be seen, the reliability of the MUX control subsystem decreases more sharply 
than the reliability of other subsystems, meaning that it is the least reliable subsystem of 
the BOP. The reliability plots of the annular and ram preventer systems follow very 
similar trajectories, gradually decreasing until they reach zero after about 50 years. The 
hydraulic connector subsystem is seen to have slightly higher reliability over time; 
however, its reliability reaches zero at the same ti  as the annular and ram preventers. 
Lastly, the choke and kill system is shown to have the highest reliability over time by a 
significantly margin.  
** Figure 7 ** 
Figure 7. Reliability of five main BOP subsystems. 
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The reliability of the entire BOP system is plotted in Figure 8. The graph shows 
that the BOP reliability decreases rapidly during the early years of operation and then 
reduces gradually until it reaches zero. This means that the probability that the system 
will successfully perform its required functions eventually drops to zero. 
** Figure 8 ** 
Figure 8. Reliability of the entire BOP system. 
The availability of the BOP system over the first five years is also shown in Figure 
9. It is seen that the availability of the system drops significantly during the first year of 
operation. Availability values are reliant on failure rates as well as repair times of the 
BOP subsystems. 
** Figure 9 ** 
Figure 9. Transient availability of the entire BOP system.  
In order to determine the effects of the reliability of each examined subsystem on 
the overall BOP system reliability, the reliability importance (RI) of each subsystem is 
plotted over time. RI is used as a means of determining the relative reliability 
significance of each subsystem with respect to the ov rall system reliability. The 
formula to obtain reliability importance is given by: 
I>$ = 	 ?>@0?>A0  ,                                                                                                   (5) 
where 6B$ and 68$ denote the overall system reliability and the subsystem reliability 
at a given time t, respectively.  
** Figure 10 ** 
Figure 2. Reliability importance of five main BOP subsystems. 
Since the BOP is considered as a series system, the least reliable component will 
have the highest impact on the reliability of the system and hence the highest reliability 
importance. From Figure 2, the MUX control system can be seen to have the highest 
reliability importance. This is in agreement with the study performed by Holand and 
Awan (2012), showing the control subsystem to be the most critical subsystem within 
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the BOP system. This also indicates that the control system requires the most attention 
with regards to inspection and maintenance. 
The failure criticality index (FCI), which identifies the contribution of each 
subsystem to the overall BOP system failure, is also determined. FCI can be calculated 
by the following equation: 
FCI8 =	EFGHIJ	KL	LMNOFJIP	QMFPIR	HS	PFHPSPTIG	8	NU	,0EFGHIJ	KL	VWX	PSPTPIG	LMNOFJIP	NU	,0   ,                                                (6) 
The FCI plot in Figure 11 shows that the MUX control system has the highest FCI 
by a considerable margin with a value of 49.7%, followed by the annular preventer at 
15.5%, ram preventer at 14.3%, hydraulic connectors at 12.1% and the choke and kill 
system at 8.4%. This therefore means the MUX control system is responsible for nearly 
half of the BOP failures. 
** Figure 11 ** 
Figure 3. Failure criticality index for five main BOP subsystems. 
The mean time between failure (MTBF) for the entire system is also obtained. The 
MTBF is an important reliability metric which is cal ulated by dividing the total amount 
of time the system should be in operation by the number of times maintenance actions 
occurred. Therefore,  

Y = Z[	,                                                   (7) 
The MTBF of the BOP system is calculated as 1.14 years.  
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis is performed to evaluate theeffect of key decisions (such as 
changing the fault coverage factor and adding redundancy) on the BOP system 
performance. The fault coverage factor is a key metric in assessing the effectiveness of 
condition monitoring (CM) solutions. This factor refers to the percentage of faults that 
can be detected during the monitoring of any engineered system. The fault coverage can 




The effects of the fault coverage factor on the system availability, failure criticality 
index and MTBF are analysed. Figure 4 shows the effct of different fault coverage 
factors on BOP availability.  
** Figure 12 ** 
Figure 4. Effect of fault coverage factor on BOP system availability. 
As can be seen, the availability of the BOP system d creases as the fault coverage 
factor drops. The lower the coverage factor, the less ikely it is for failure to be detected 
and the lower the system availability. 
Figure 13 shows the effects of different fault coverage factors at 80%, 60%, 40% 
and 20% on the system failure criticality index (FCI).  
** Figure 13 ** 
Figure 13. The effects of (a) 80% (b) 60% (c) 40% (d) 20% fault coverage factor on BOP 
system failure criticality index (FCI). 
As can be seen, a decrease in fault coverage factor results in corresponding 
decrease in FCI for the MUX control system. The fault coverage factor, however, does 
not seem to affect the order of subsystems in the FCI plots as there is no discernible 
pattern in subsystem order as the fault coverage factor decreases.  
The effect of variation in fault coverage factor on the MTBF is also investigated. 
The results of this analysis are given in Table 3.  
** Table 3 ** 
Table 3. The effect of fault coverage factor on MTBF. 
The MTBF of the BOP system is seen to decrease when t  coverage factor 
reduces. This therefore means that the amount of time hat the system remains in 
operation reduces as fault detection becomes less effective. 
A new redundant BOP configuration by adding a second MUX control system to 
the conventional BOP is introduced. The MUX control system is chosen because it is 
the most critical subsystem. The effect of redundancy on BOP system availability is 
investigated and the results show that the BOP system availability increased by 0.03% 
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from 0.9922 to 0.9925. The effect of redundancy on the MTBF of the BOP system is 
also investigated with the results showing an increase of 4.4% in MTBF from 1.14 years 
to 1.19 years. The increases in both MTBF and availbility reflect the benefit of 
redundancy to subsea BOP systems.     
5 Conclusion and future works 
This paper presented an advanced reliability analysis technique using stochastic petri 
nets (SPN) and reliability-block diagram (RBD) for subsea blowout preventer (BOP) 
systems while incorporating the degradation and conditi  monitoring (CM) 
information. The subsea BOP was divided into five subsystems (including annular 
preventers, ram preventers, hydraulic connectors, choke and kill system, and MUX 
control system) which are connected in series with each other. The reliability, 
availability and mean time between failures (MTBF) of the BOP system were estimated. 
The control system was concluded as being the leastr liable subsystem and this was 
confirmed by the control system having the highest reliability importance by a 
significant margin as well as being responsible for nearly half of the total system 
failures. The MTBF of the entire BOP system was determined to be 1.14 years. A 
sensitivity analysis was also performed to evaluate th  effect of improving fault 
coverage as well as adding redundancy (in the form f an additional MUX control 
system) on the BOP system performance. The results howed that both the fault 
coverage and redundancy had significant impact on the system availability and MTBF 
but little discernible effect on the failure criticality index (FCI). As coverage factor 
decreased, so did the system availability and MTBF emphasising the importance of 
accurate detection of faults in subsea BOP operation. Adding a second MUX control 
system also led to increase in system availability and MTBF.   
There is a lot of potential for future research in the area of reliability analysis of 
subsea safety instrumented systems. For this research, we only studied the reliability of 
the subsea BOP system when taking into account CM and system degradation. A 
promising avenue for future research can be the adapt tion of the methodology applied 
in this research study for other subsea assets. Another promising avenue for further 
research can be on the performance of reliability analysis of subsea safety instrumented 
systems based on different forms of degradation. Research on the use of coloured Petri 
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nets (CPNs) for reliability analysis of complex subea systems is another opportunity 
which can be explored in the future (see Noori and Waag (2019)).  
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Table 1. Life data for degrading BOP subsystems. 




















Failure to close 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.61 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.61 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.61 
0.0306 0.0112 
 
Failure to fully 
open 
 = 0.53 
 = 1.35 
 = 0.53 
 = 1.35 
 = 0.53 





 = 1.48 
 = 2.36 
 = 1.48 
 = 2.36 
 = 1.48 




through a closed 
annular 
 = 0.48 
 = 0.60 
 = 0.48 
 = 0.60 
 = 0.48 
 = 0.60 
0.0020  
 Other  = 1.0 
 = 0.61 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.61 
 = 1.0 




External leakage  = 1.47 
 = 12.55 
 = 1.47 

= 12.55 
 = 1.47 
 = 12.55 
0.0411 0.0088 
 Failure to close 
 = 1.0 
 = 1.61 
 = 1.0 
 = 1.61 
 = 1.0 
 = 1.61 
0.0007  
 
Failure to fully 
open 
 = 1.0 
 = 1.61 
 = 1.0 
 = 1.61 
 = 1.0 
 = 1.61 
0.0027  
 Internal leakage 
 = 0.43 
 = 0.46 
 = 0.43 
 = 0.46 
 = 0.43 
 = 0.46 
0.0072  
 Unknown failure 
 = 1.0 
 = 1.61 
 = 1.0 
 = 1.61 
 = 1.0 




External leakage of 
BOP attached line 
 = 0.74 
 = 1.83 
 = 0.74 
 = 1.83 
 = 0.74 
 = 1.83 
0.0209 0.0134 
 Unknown failure 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.33 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.33 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.33 
0.0027  
 
External leakage on 
jumper hose line 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.33 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.33 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.33 
0.0027  
 
External leakage on 
riser attached line 
 = 0.47 
 = 0.35 
 = 0.47 
 = 0.35 
 = 0.47 




External leakage  = 0.94 
 = 4.19 
 = 0.94 
 = 4.19 
 = 0.94 
 = 4.19 
0.0096 0.0091 
 Failure to lock 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.65 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.65 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.65 
0.0192  
 Failure to unlock  = 1.0 
 = 0.65 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.65 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.65 
0.0109  
 Spurious unlock 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.65 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.65 
 = 1.0 
 = 0.65 
0.0027  
 Unknown failure 
 = 1.46 
 = 2.57 
 = 1.46 
 = 2.57 
 = 1.46 





Table 2. Model input parameters for the MUX control subsystem. 








Loss of all 
functions: both 
pods 
9.85 ×	10 2.05 ×	10 0.0074 
 
Loss of all 
functions: one 
pod 
8.21 ×	10 1.6 ×	10  
 
Loss of one 
function: both 
pods 
2.48 ×	10 1.71 ×	10  
 
Loss of several 
functions: one 
pod 
9.85 ×	10 0.61 ×	10  
 Other 5.22 ×	10 1.15 ×	10  
 Unknown failure 1.23 ×	10 3.42 ×	10  
 
 
Table 3. The effect of fault coverage factor on MTBF. 









Figure 1. Conventional (left) and modern (right) BOP configurations (Liu et al., 2015b). 
 
 
Figure 2. Petri net model for the annular preventer system. 
 
 
Figure 3. Petri net model for the choke and kill system. 
 
 
Figure 4. Petri net model for the hydraulic connectors. 
 
 
Figure 5. Petri net model for the ram preventers. 
 
 
Figure 6. Petri net model for the MUX control subsystem. 
 
 
Figure 7. Reliability of five main BOP subsystems. 
 
Figure 8. Reliability of the entire BOP system. 
 
 
Figure 9. Transient availability of the entire BOP system.  
 
Figure 2. Reliability importance of five main BOP subsystems. 
 
 
Figure 3. Failure criticality index for five main BOP subsystems. 
 






























Figure 5. The effects of (a) 80% coverage factor (b) 60% coverage factor (c) 40% coverage factor (d) 20% coverage factor on the system failure 




 An advanced reliability analysis method using stochastic Petri-net (SPN) and 
reliability block diagram (RBD) for subsea BOP systems; 
 To incorporate system degradation and condition monitoring (CM) information in 
the BOP reliability analysis;  
 To assess the performance of five BOP subsystems in terms of availability, 
reliability and mean-time-between failures (MTBF); 
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